| dc.description.abstract | In 2002, a team of researchers at the State University of New York led by Eckard
Wimmer assembled a DNA template for the RNA poliovirus using an internet-available
nucleotide sequence and mail order synthetic oligonucleotides. Using a routine
laboratory procedure, they then converted the DNA into RNA and produced an
infectious, neurovirulent poliovirus capable of paralyzing and killing mice.1
This work demonstrated clearly for the first time the feasibility of chemically
synthesizing a pathogen knowing only its nucleotide sequence. Some called the work
“irresponsible,” and there was widespread speculation in the press that bioterrorists might
use the technology to create more virulent viruses, such as smallpox, from published gene
sequences or create novel, more lethal viruses. Wimmer countered that “an evildoer
would not use that very tedious method to synthesize a virus. That terrorist would rather
use already existing viruses in nature.” 2
Indeed, all viruses, from the common cold to the deadliest, originate in nature, being
identified and isolated from infected humans or animals or the virus’s animal or insect
vector. However, the rapidly advancing technology of whole genome assembly
(“synthetic genomics”) is making the chemical synthesis of viral genomes a much less
tedious endeavor.3
This paper will explore the potential impact of synthetic genomics technology on the
risks of a bioterrorist attack using viral pathogens. | en |
